Musings on the Torah

This article endeavors to show that Rambams formulation of the famous כשם wish at a bris milah (and possible limitation of its recital) is consistent with his opinion of there being a unique element to a fathers obligation not shared by anyone else Rambam holds (milah 3:1) that when a father performs the actual milah himself he says "למול" whereas when someone else does it for him the mohel says "על המילה". This coheres with his previously stated opinion (berachos 11:11-13) that employing "ל" vs "על" turns on if one is performing a personal obligation as opposed to assisting another with their own.  (Compare with geirim in halacha 'ד where all share in the same mitzvah and thus equally say "למול".)  He then says that the beracha of "להכניסו" is only said by the father, not when beis din or anyone else administers the bris, providing the rationale שֶׁמִּצְוָה עַל הָאָב לָמוּל אֶת בְּנוֹ יָתֵר עַל הַמִּצְוָה שֶׁמְּצֻוִּין כָ

Theres a long running dispute in Judaism with the rationalist school of thought on one hand and the kabalistic one on the other regarding if the notion of gilgul neshama has a legitimate place in yahadus.  The Talmud Bavli does not explicitly weigh in on the issue.  However, implicitly, it apparently does.  Bava Metziah 107a states ברוך אתה בבואך וברוך אתה בצאתך שתהא יציאתך מן העולם כביאתך לעולם מה ביאתך לעולם בלא חטא אף יציאתך מן העולם בלא חטא with רש"ש famously commenting מכאן סתירה קצת לבעלי דעת הגלגול by which he means that if ones takes up the belief in gilgul then how can the talmud say that he was clean of sin when he was born as perhaps he is a gilgul that is here to rectify an issue from a previous life. Rashash says that it's only a minor problem by which he is apparently alluding to the deflection that the gemara can possibly be referring to the souls initial descent when it was still unsullied.  In any case, he was roundly attacked by the faithful for daring to su

States of mourning and (nuptial related) joy are both regulated by halacha in precisely the same temporally delineated gradations as it relates to the intensity of nihugei aveilus and simcha. It is reflective of how emotions and feelings are initially acute and how they become progressively weaker with the passage of time. Specifically, they share 5 stages in the progression of their individual laws. They are as follows: The day of the death/chasuna; the first 3 days; 7 days; 30 days and finally a year. (They share the concept of "פנים חדשות" which has to do with the strong feelings of joy/sorrow becoming aroused again due to their [the פנים חדשות] appearance and participation.) The strong emotions which are generated by these major life events register most poignantly closest to the moment of death/marriage and gradually get more attenuated as time goes on and one gets farther away from the traumatic/ecstatic event.  This is manifested in halacha with corresponding legislati

This write up is an exploration of some potential halachic ramifications of Rambams distinction between silently listening to a bracha versus responding amen to one Rambam (hilchos berachos 1:10-12, כ״י תימניים) writes as follows:  (י) כָּל הַבְּרָכוֹת כֻּלָּן - אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁבֵּרֵךְ וְיָצָא יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ, מֻתָּר לוֹ לְבָרֵךְ לַאֲחֵרִים שֶׁלֹּא יָצְאוּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתָן כְּדֵי לְהוֹצִיאָן, חוּץ מִבִּרְכַּת הַהֲנָיָה שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ מִצְוָה, שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְבָרֵךְ לַאֲחֵרִים אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן נֶהֱנָה עִמָּהֶן. אֲבָל בִּרְכַּת הֲנָיָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ מִצְוָה, כְּגוֹן אֲכִילַת מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח וְקִדּוּשׁ הַיּוֹם - הֲרֵי זֶה מְבָרֵךְ לַאֲחֵרִים וְאוֹכְלִין וְשׁוֹתִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה עִמָּהֶן. (יא) כָּל הַשּׁוֹמֵעַ בְּרָכָה מִן הַבְּרָכוֹת מִתְּחִלָּתָהּ וְעַד סוֹפָהּ, וְנִתְכַּוֵּן לָצֵאת בָּהּ יְדֵי חוֹבָתוֹ - יָצָא, וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא עָנָה אָמֵן. וְכָל הָעוֹנֶה אָמֵן אַחַר הַמְּבָרֵךְ - הֲרֵי הוּא כַּמְּבָרֵךְ; וְהוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַמְּבָרֵךְ חַיָּב בְּאוֹתָה

Over time, it has grown on me that the following meforshim adopt four different models in harmonizing (purely text based) peshat with traditional (read: Chazal's) interpretations and notion of peshat Derash — Rashi typically selects midrashic statements that hew close to the plain meaning of the pesukim and deploys them as peshat. When that is unavailable or he will proffer an explanation in accordance with peshuto shel mikra. He will not explicate a verse in a way that contravenes the halacha. (The "Derash" designation is due to Rashi ostensibly being of the opinion that Chazals statements—at least the ones that he selects —represent peshat) Peshat — Rashbam interprets according to what he considers the straightforward and unadorned reading (omek hapeshat). He doesn't make any effort to have it cohere with Chazals explanations. He seems to posit the existence of two disparate tracts, peshat on the one hand, and the accepted rabbinic tradition on the other, which is b

This piece theorizes as to Rambams motivation in interpreting a pasuk along with its codification in a way that was seen by some as contravening the mesorah The Torah grants both a father and husband the ability to annul a wife and daughters vows, respectively.  All agree that a husbands rights are limited to nedarim that pertain to עינוי נפש ודברים שבינו לבינה. Sifri and Yerushalmi, with the rishonim following their lead, limit a father's powers of annulment to the same categories as a husband.  There's a lone dissenting voice, you guessed it, none other than Rambam, who differentiates between the two, giving a father unlimited scope in his control over the validity of his daughters vows.  His language is as follows (nedarim 12:1): כָּל הַנְּדָרִים וְהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת הָאָב מֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל':ו') כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ. אֲבָל הַבַּעַל אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר אֶלָּא כָּל נְדָרִים וּשְׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִנּוּי נֶפֶשׁ אוֹ שֶׁהֵן בִּדְבָרִים

The following draws attention to a nuanced formulation in the MT which sheds light on Rambams idea of the halachic implications of marriage  When spouses forbid themselves (via a neder) to each other as it relates to marital relations, the gemara says that it only works if they forbid their spouse's pleasure to themselves (with the consequence of אין מאכילין לאדם דבר האסור לו), however if they forbid themselves to each other it's a no-go as they are obligated to engage in relations with each other.  In the two places that bavli nedarim discusses this (15b and 81b) it phrases it as the wife being obligated in relations (מְשֻׁעְבֶּדֶת), hence precluding the neder from taking effect.  Ditto for Tur and SA (YD 234). SA's language is as follows (se'if 67): הָא דְּחָל נֶדֶר מִתַּשְׁמִישׁ, דַּוְקָא שֶׁאָמְרָה: הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישְׁךָ עָלַי, אֲבָל אָמְרָה: הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישִׁי עָלֶיךָ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר, שֶׁהִיא מְשֻׁעְבֶּדֶת לוֹ . וְכֵן הוּא שֶׁאָמַר: (הֲנָאַת) תַּשְׁמִישִ

This piece explores the Torahs differing treatment of the go'el hadam in two chumashim positing that it turns on which stage of the rotzeach bshogeg's galus journey is under discussion  Theres a disagreement between two baraisos in bavli makkos 10b regarding if a go'el hadam is culpable for avenging his relative's death by eliminating the manslaughterer (my own coinage so far that I'm aware of). It turns on how to render a particular phrase in the following verse in shofetim (devarim 19:6) פֶּן⁠־יִרְדֹּף֩ גֹּאֵ֨ל הַדָּ֜ם אַחֲרֵ֣י הָרֹצֵ֗חַ כִּי⁠־יֵחַם֮ לְבָבוֹ֒ וְהִשִּׂיג֛וֹ כִּֽי⁠־יִרְבֶּ֥ה הַדֶּ֖רֶךְ וְהִכָּ֣הוּ נָ֑פֶשׁ וְלוֹ֙ אֵ֣ין מִשְׁפַּט⁠־מָ֔וֶת כִּ֠י לֹ֣א שֹׂנֵ֥א ה֛וּא ל֖וֹ מִתְּמ֥וֹל שִׁלְשֽׁוֹם׃ see Ri bchor shor ad loc ולו אין משפט מות – לרוצח, כי בשוגג הכהו. ואיכא למאן דאמר (בבלי מכות י':): בגואל הדם הכתוב מדבר, כלומר: יש לירא שמא יהרגנו, שהרי אין ירא כלום אם הרגו, שאין לו משפט מות, כי גואל הדם הוא. Rav Huna is cited there (makkos 10b) as supporting

This article is an analysis of the mechanics of yerusha, distilled to its purest form, showing how differing abstract conceptions thereof have decidedly real world consequences  The parasha (in this case literally) of nachalos (Bamidbar 27:6-11) prescribes that upon death an estate first passes to ones children (male, then female), lacking that (or any descendants) it proceeds upward to dad (see Ramban to verse 9), and if hes no longer around it goes to his children ie the siblings of the dear departed (including descendants), with this pattern continuing on ever upward.  At its core, biblical inheritance seems to follow a simple two step vertical formula: first to ones progeny (with the male having precedence) and then to ones (male) progenitor . This formula repeats until finding a living yoresh.  According to this a person bequeaths in both vertical directions: downward to ones children and upward to ones father. In other words, yerusha is limited to ones immediate vertical relati

The following observation draws attention to a curious correlation in the (Rambams) laws of tefilin and tzitzis Rambam codifies the following (hilchos tefilin 3:14) הָרְצוּעוֹת שֶׁלַּתְּפִלִּין, בֵּין שֶׁלָּרֹאשׁ בֵּין שֶׁלַּיָּד - פְּנֵיהֶן הַחִיצוֹנִים שְׁחֹרִים, וְזוֹ הִיא הַהֲלָכָה שֶׁלְּמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי. אֲבָל אֲחוֹרֵי הָרְצוּעוֹת - הוֹאִיל וּמִבִּפְנִים הֵן, אִם הָיוּ יְרֻקּוֹת אוֹ לְבָנוֹת, כְּשֵׁרוֹת; אֲדֻמּוֹת לֹא יַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁמָּא תֵּהָפֵךְ הָרְצוּעָה, וּגְנַאי הוּא לוֹ. וְלֹא יִהְיוּ אֲחוֹרֵי הָרְצוּעָה לְעוֹלָם אֶלָּא כְּעֵין הַקְּצִיצָה: אִם יְרֻקָּה - יְרֻקִּין; וְאִם לְבָנָה - לְבָנִים. וְנוֹאי הוּא לַתְּפִלִּין שֶׁיִּהְיוּ כֻּלָּן שְׁחֹרוֹת, הַקְּצִיצָה וְהָרְצוּעָה כֻּלָּהּ. In other words the hilchisa that tefilin need be black only governs the front of the retzuos, the retzua back as well as the battim can be of any color (excluding red) so long as they are matching. Interestingly we find an identical idea in hilchos tzitzis. Rambam writes that the "lavan"