The go'el hadam of Bamidbar vs Devarim

This piece explores the Torahs differing treatment of the go'el hadam in two chumashim positing that it turns on which stage of the rotzeach bshogeg's galus journey is under discussion 

Theres a disagreement between two baraisos in bavli makkos 10b regarding if a go'el hadam is culpable for avenging his relative's death by eliminating the manslaughterer (my own coinage so far that I'm aware of). It turns on how to render a particular phrase in the following verse in shofetim (devarim 19:6) פֶּן⁠־יִרְדֹּף֩ גֹּאֵ֨ל הַדָּ֜ם אַחֲרֵ֣י הָרֹצֵ֗חַ כִּי⁠־יֵחַם֮ לְבָבוֹ֒ וְהִשִּׂיג֛וֹ כִּֽי⁠־יִרְבֶּ֥ה הַדֶּ֖רֶךְ וְהִכָּ֣הוּ נָ֑פֶשׁ וְלוֹ֙ אֵ֣ין מִשְׁפַּט⁠־מָ֔וֶת כִּ֠י לֹ֣א שֹׂנֵ֥א ה֛וּא ל֖וֹ מִתְּמ֥וֹל שִׁלְשֽׁוֹם׃ see Ri bchor shor ad loc ולו אין משפט מות – לרוצח, כי בשוגג הכהו. ואיכא למאן דאמר (בבלי מכות י':): בגואל הדם הכתוב מדבר, כלומר: יש לירא שמא יהרגנו, שהרי אין ירא כלום אם הרגו, שאין לו משפט מות, כי גואל הדם הוא.

Rav Huna is cited there (makkos 10b) as supporting the reading that exonerates the go'el hadam, and so codifies Rambam (rotzeach 5:9), basing it on said interpretation. 

Peshuto shel mikra does not seem to support this reading, see all the aramaic targumim (with targum yerushalmi [neofiti] even spelling out that the go'el would be culpable ויקטל יתיה ויתחייב בנפשיה), nevertheless so is the halacha decided. 

What's peculiar is that theres an explicit mishnah in makkos (tb makkos 11b) that cites a disagreement as to the scope of the avengers rights, with all in agreement that taking the manslaughterer's life is fully allowed, with no legal repercussions for the go'el hadam: רוֹצֵחַ שֶׁיָּצָא חוּץ לַתְּחוּם וּמְצָאוֹ גּוֹאֵל הַדָּם, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי הַגָּלִילִי אוֹמֵר: מִצְוָה בְּיַד גּוֹאֵל הַדָּם, וּרְשׁוּת בְּיַד כָּל אָדָם. רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: רְשׁוּת בְּיַד גּוֹאֵל הַדָּם, וְכָל אָדָם חַיָּיבִין עָלָיו.

Rashi (10b), ostensibly picking up on this, comments as follows (on Rav Huna's dictum exonerating the go'el post facto): בדרך בהליכתו, with Bach explaining that it is in contradistinction to where he is already serving his court mandated galus sentence when if he strays outside the ir miklat he is fair game for the go'el hadam (in accordance with the mishnah on 11b). 

In other words, there are two phases in the manslaughterer's vulnerability to a blood avenger. 

The first phase is right after the tragic incident, when he quickly bolts to the ir miklat to avoid the vengeful passion of the blood avenger, pending a trial back in the city where the tragedy occured with his eventual return to the ir miklat if it is determined to have been inadvertent, albeit not negligent or an act of God (see R Yose bar Yehuda's description in the mishnah on 9b). 

It's at that stage that it is impermissible for the go'el to do the rotzeach bshogeg harm, with the tanaim arguing if he is culpable should he indeed do so, with Rav Huna ruling that he is not. 

The second phase commences after the court rules that he is on the hook for galus and he starts serving it, when if he wanders beyond the boundaries of the ir miklat he is fair game with one opinion even requiring the go'el to kill him. 

This distinction is actually reflected in the mishnah on 11b which, when introducing the disagreement, explicitly spells out that it pertains to when he leaves the ir miklat, see the language above. It is also seen in the placement of the relevant gemara, with the sugya on 10b connected to the mishnah on 9b whose context is the manslaughterer's condition prior to the start the galus sentence. 

It is also seen in Rambams articulation (rotzeach 5:9-10)                                                                                                     (ט) רוֹצֵחַ בִּשְׁגָגָה שֶׁהֲרָגוֹ גּוֹאֵל הַדָּם חוּץ לִתְחוּם עִיר מִקְלָטוֹ פָּטוּר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים י"ט:ו') וְלוֹ אֵין מִשְׁפַּט מָוֶת (י) אֶחָד הַהוֹרְגוֹ בַּדֶּרֶךְ קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּכָּנֵס לְעִיר מִקְלָט אוֹ שֶׁהֲרָגוֹ בַּחֲזִירָתוֹ עִם הַשְּׁנַיִם שֶׁשּׁוֹמְרִין אוֹתוֹ.      

 נִכְנַס לְעִיר מִקְלָטוֹ וְיָצָא חוּץ לִתְחוּמָהּ בְּזָדוֹן הֲרֵי זֶה הִתִּיר עַצְמוֹ לְמִיתָה וּרְשׁוּת לְגוֹאֵל הַדָּם לְהָרְגוֹ. וְאִם הֲרָגוֹ כָּל אָדָם אֵין חַיָּבִין עָלָיו שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל"ה:כ"ז) אֵין לוֹ דָּם:                                                              where he clearly differentiates between the two periods (I segmented them differently than the MT texts I'm seeing, I dont know if there are manuscripts that support me, but it seems more logical)

Ritva, contrary to his teachers, also (tremulously) alludes to such a distinction (on 12a).

Presumably, and as deducible from the previously quoted halachos in MT, aside for if the go'el hadam himself is given latitude in eliminating the rotzeach bshogeg, there is also a difference with regard to other people. In the first phase, where killing him is frowned upon, only the go'el hadam is given a pass should his passion prove too challenging to overcome, not anyone else (only וְלוֹ֙ אֵ֣ין מִשְׁפַּט⁠־מָ֔וֶת—not anyone else). As opposed to the second stage (if he steps out of the ir's boundaries), where should other folks take him out (despite its impermissibility) they aren't censured, as he is in a state of אֵין לוֹ דָּם. 

These two different stages are actually treated separately in the Torah (as in different chumashim!) with the discussion in Matos about a manslaughterer that leaves the ir miklat's protective boundary and the discussion in Shofetim about one that is first running there—prior to any judicial determination having been made—in an attempt to save his own life.

In Bamidbar 35, where the discussion is about his leaving the ir miklat—וְאִם⁠־יָצֹ֥א יֵצֵ֖א (ibid:26), it clearly spells out that the go'el isn't culpable for killing the manslaughterer—אֵין לוֹ דָּם (ibid:27), as the manslaughterer has made himself fair game by leaving the boundaries (to use Rambams formulation). The verse that either permits or even encourages the go'el to take revenge (makkos 12a) is also found in that passage (ibid).

Devarim 19, on the other hand, is specifically talking about making provisions for a rotzeach bshogeg that may need to contend with a go'el hadam in hot pursuit, with the pasuk (ibid:6) saying the crucial, pivotal and hotly contested phrase וְלוֹ֙ אֵ֣ין מִשְׁפַּט⁠־מָ֔וֶת. 

Fascinatingly, starting from the chumashim themselves, on to the talmud and down to the rishonim we can discern two discrete phases in the life of a manslaughterer with each having respectively appropriate governing laws.